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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, the transformation of the legal status of women will be examined. 
Beginning with a discussion of the common law foundations and focusing especially on 
coverture, this paper will provide a history of how women’s place in society developed 
through legislation as they gradually evolved from being recognized as the property of 
their husbands to being sovereign individuals. This progression for women was slow, and 
remains incomplete. Despite progress, echoes of patriarchal oppression still exist in law 
today.   
The legal inferiority of women derives from British common laws accepted by 
colonists. Societal norms in those times dictated that a woman remain connected to some 
level of male leadership, be it a husband or immediate male family member. Coverture, a 
concept derived from the French femme-covert, ensured that a woman’s civil identity was 
essentially non-existent. Once a woman married, everything she had--including property, 
inheritance, possessions, and earnings--belonged to her husband. Women lost rights to 
their names, custody of their children, and freedom to acquire property. Politically, a man 
and his wife were viewed as a single individual, suspending the legal existence of women 
altogether.  
Women have fought for their legal rights and independence since the founding of 
our nation. Activist and women’s organizations demanded suffrage and made incremental 
steps toward legal equality. Following the American Civil War, many women urged for a 
reform in the common law foundations rules of coverture. These laws had implications 
beyond those explicitly stated, as men became responsible not only for their wives’ 
financial stability and protection, but also for instilling discipline. Many cases developed 
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that reinforced the role of women as property; domestic violence and rape were 
prosecuted as crimes against property rather than people. Much of the women’s 
movement focused on establishing women as human beings in an effort to create policy 
change.  
Over time, strides were made toward equality as women gained marriage rights, 
labor rights, suffrage, and the ability to serve in the military. These strides were slow, and 
oftentimes halted entirely. Each of these issues can be connected back to the concept of 
coverture and the idea of women as property. Some of these legal concepts have only 
been addressed in recent history, despite the timeworn logic of their foundations. There 
are many laws, particularly related to domestic and sexual assault that, even now, echo 
the idea of women as the property of others in need of direction, protection, and 
discipline.  
  
Women	  in	  Legislation	   4	  
“The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own 
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society. ” 
-Sandra Day O’Connor 
The legal rights of women have completely transformed over the course of 
America’s history. Women began life in America as civilly irrelevant. From this position 
women strived, incrementally, to eradicate the limitations of their own empowerment. 
Identifying the major political and social moments of this progression provide the 
necessary re-examination of law and history that will help to dissolve the laws that still 
inhibit gender equality today.  
In this paper, multiple aspects of the progression of women will be examined, 
beginning with the origins of American law. We first examine British common law and 
the manner in which it was integrated into the various colonies. The theories that created 
the foundation for the female role in American society, such as coverture, had poignant 
implications for the legal structure that followed. These concepts, though seemingly 
archaic, were vehemently defended in court decisions for decades. Throughout history, 
we see women slowly begin to combat these oppressive laws, though this struggle was 
significantly more complicated than is often understood. Each period examined in this 
paper includes a number of significant historical events, powerful individuals, and 
innovative decisions that ultimately forged new paths in the realm of women’s rights.  
Examining this progression is also vitally important because it remains an 
ongoing process. In identifying key elements of the origins of the role of women in 
American law, it is evident that those origins can still be found in modern legislation. 
Finally, an examination of how those foundations, despite a significant amount of 
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progress, still inform the legal status of women in this country will be undertaken. Given 
the connection between social realities and legislation as established by this discussion, 
these persisting ideals ultimately serve to prevent women from achieving true equality.  
Common Law 
In order to effectively examine the progression of women in law, it is imperative 
to first examine the foundation of law in America. The origins of the American legal 
system are deeply rooted in English Law (Salmon, 1986). There was a wide range of 
diverse laws in England including the “law of the crown, law of parliament, law of 
nature… of which the common law of England was just one” (Stoebuck, 1968, p. 397). 
Common law specifically refers to “that body of governing principles, mainly 
substantive, expounded by the common law courts of England” (Stoebuck, 1968, p. 383). 
That being said, there is a significant amount of debate as to the extent to which colonies 
adopted what was truly common law.  
Upon the construction of the thirteen original colonies, the need for just laws was 
acknowledged immediately, but a unified adoption of English law was never an 
expectation (Salmon, 1986). The most renowned theory on adoption of common law is 
attributed to Justice Joseph Story, who wrote: 
The common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of 
America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and 
claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only 
that portion that was applicable to their situation. (Stoebuck, 1968, p. 383)  
The idea of adopting only portions of common law is echoed by law professor and 
author, George Haskins, who summarizes the inclusion of common law by saying “the 
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conditions of settlement and of development within each colony meant that each evolved 
its own individual legal system, just as each evolved its individual social and political 
system” (Salmon, 1986, p. 4).  
The colonies were free to consider their unique demographic, cultural, and 
economic needs when incorporating the tradition of British common law (Salmon, 1986). 
Though it is difficult to summarize the many individual adaptations, in general, the 
southern colonies followed common law more closely due to, among other things, a lack 
of “an ideological commitment to change” (Salmon, 1986, p. 10). In the northern 
colonies, Massachusetts in particular, there was less of a sense of obligation to adhere to 
the common law standard (Stoebuck, 1968).  
In establishing their individual legal systems, the ultimate goal of the colonies 
was to seek “social stability above all else,” which made laws regarding women and their 
role in society of vital importance (Salmon, 1986, p. 13).  Colonies began constructing 
social realities for women with legal parameters of marriage. Though there were many 
variations of the adoption of common law, the laws constructed involving marriage were 
closely in line with concepts derived in common law across the colonies (Salmon, 1986).  
In many ways, the colonies clung to common law in establishing the legal 
framework of marriage in America. The harsh realities of living in colonial America 
“necessitated reliance on protective strategies for wives…” (Salmon, 1986, p. 11). This 
concept of protection informed laws regarding women ranging from property rights to 
civil duties. “Her position was essentially that accorded by the common law, the 
fundamental thesis being the almost complete subordination of her person and property to 
her husband” (Salmon, 1986, p. 13). Interestingly, much of a woman’s legal inferiority 
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did not come into play until she was married. “At common law, unmarried females were 
subject to oppressive sexually discriminatory rules of law principally in the public 
sphere… In the areas of contracts and property, however, single women enjoyed almost 
equal status with single males…When single women married, however, these rights were 
lost or suspended” (Kanowitz, 1969, p. 35).  
 Though common law was applied uniquely across the different colonies, it played 
a vital role in the foundations of the American legal system. These foundations 
established and formally solidified women’s place in this new society, which remained 
the standard for decades to follow.  
Coverture: Blackstone’s Legacy in the Colonies 
One of the many concepts evident in the adopted British common law used by the 
American colonies was that of coverture. More specifically, Sir William Blackstone in 
his commentaries of the Laws of England in the seventeenth century, described coverture 
and unity of a person in such a way that influenced generations of English and American 
law (Stretton, 2009). Blackstone believed that subservient women were a necessary 
component for “ordering civil society” (Stretton, 2009, p. 122). Leaning heavily on 
Genesis 2:22-23, which states, “And Adam said, this is now bone of my bones, and flesh 
of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of man. Therefore 
shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife and they shall 
be one flesh,” Blackstone constructed the foundation of what would become the legal 
reality of women for centuries (Kanowitz, 1973 p. 63). In the fourth book of his 
commentaries Blackstone established coverture as: 
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By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that is, the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, 
or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under 
whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is 
therefore called on in our law-french a femme covert…upon this principle 
of a union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal 
rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by marriage. 
(Warbasse, 1987, p. 6)  
This doctrine had implications larger than mere legal inferiority. It held that “the 
husband and wife were but one person possessing but one will and that that will resided 
in the mind of the husband as the person fittest and ablest to provide for and govern the 
family” (Stretton, 2009, p. 112). In essence, coverture asserted that women lacked 
independent wills from their husbands, and therefore required no legal status at all 
(Stretton, 2009).  
Another conceptual consequence of Blackstone’s writings was the adoption of “unity 
of a person” (Stretton, 2009, p. 113). The idea that the man and wife were actually one 
person had never been combined with coverture before Blackstone’s commentaries 
(Stretton, 2009). Blackstone suggested that these ideas “amounted to the key underlying 
principle behind married women’s status, rights, and obligations at common law” 
(Stretton, 2009, p. 119). These two now connected notions cemented women’s inferiority 
in the newly constructed American legal system. 
One of several real-world implications of Blackstone’s ideas was manifested in the 
law that women could not, due to their lack of legal existence, convey property. Upon 
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marriage, “all a woman’s possessions went to her husband; he could dispose of them any 
way he wished during his lifetime or by will afterwards” (Warbasse, 1987, p. 7). This 
concept varied greatly among the colonies, and many states eventually added provisions 
under which women could convey property in some circumstances using The Married 
Women’s Property Act of 1839 (Warbasse, 1987). In the early stages, however, this 
restriction was overwhelming. “The fact that the law even found it necessary to guarantee 
her clothes, ornaments, and bedding shows how absolutely the husband controlled his 
wife’s personal property” (Warbasse, 1987, p. 13). 
Married women were also deprived of the ability to execute a valid legal contract. 
This occurred for multiple reasons, the first of which was a woman’s lack of personal 
property. No agreement, it was argued, “could be enforced against her because she owned 
nothing a court could seize” (Salmon, 1986, p. 41). A lack of contracting ability extended 
to services a woman could provide. Such contracts were also believed to be 
unenforceable because “according to common law rules, a woman’s services belonged to 
her husband. They could not be given to another unless he consented” (Salmon, 1986, p. 
41).  
Unity of a person was used in contract law to further restrict women. It was 
established that “a man can not grant anything to his wife or enter into covenant with her 
for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence; and to covenant with her would 
only be to covenant with himself” (Salmon, 1986, p. 41). It was also widely believed that 
women were naturally more impressionable, as they lacked their own individual will, and 
therefore would likely be coerced into contracts because “they are in the power of their 
husbands” (Salmon, 1986, p. 42).  
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In addition to these contractual restrictions, women, in line with Blackstone’s ideals, 
were not able to prosecute or be prosecuted in the court of law. “Though a married 
woman was theoretically liable for the injuries she inflicted in this manner, that liability 
was of limited significance since the law contributed her misconduct to her husband” 
(Kanowitz, 1969, p. 75). This inequality was reinforced by the concept of male marital 
privilege:  
If women could be imprisoned their husbands would be denied sexual and 
household services. The right of a husband to the person of his wife is a right 
guarded by the law with the utmost solicitude; if she could bind herself by 
contracts, she would be liable to be arrested, taken in execution, and confined 
to a prison; and then the husband would be deprived of the company of his 
wife. (Salmon, 1986, p. 42)  
This concept, and the legal ramifications that followed, had a lasting impact on 
legislation that continues to have consequences today. 
The wife was also not permitted to act as the administrator of estates nor as legal 
guardians (Warbasse, 1987). This further restricted women’s place in society by placing 
men in charge of the domain that had been assigned as especially female, the home 
(Warbasse, 1987). The wife was also, as an extension of these principles, expected to act 
as an “agent of her husband” (Salmon, 1986, p. 53). Given that this concept could allot 
women a certain level of freedom, the agency was limited into what was deemed as 
“reasonable” wifely activities (Salmon, 1986, p. 53). For example,  
If a wife should purchase at a merchant’s store such articles as wives in 
her rank in life usually purchase, the husband ought to be bound; for it is a 
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fair presumption that she was authorized by her husband to do so. If 
however she were to purchase a ship of yoke or oxen, no such 
presumption would arise, for wives do not usually purchase ships or oxen. 
(Salmon, 1986, p. 53)  
These restrictions on women were seen as defendable for a number of reasons, 
one of which is that the restrictions were balanced by the obligations that a husband had 
to his wife (Salmon, 1986). These obligations included the responsibility of the husband 
to “maintain and treat his wife well,” “pay all her incurred debts,” provide her with the 
“necessaries” for life, accept liability for her in the court of law, and act as “the natural 
protector of her children” (Salmon, 1986, p. 53). In these obligations, Blackstone 
believed that wives, under coverture, received “the ultimate expression of Common 
Law’s benevolent paternalism” and were, therefore, able to “bask in the glow of the 
liberty in privileges of their free born husbands” (Stretton, 2009, p. 124).  
In addition to the obligations of a husband, it was widely accepted that “married 
women consented to their modified legal status when they agreed to marry” (Stretton, 
2009, p. 123). This was used in support of the legal inferiority of women, though it was 
also believed that “the married state is the only proper goal of womanhood” (Kanowitz, 
1973, p. 11). These ideals conflicted with one another, arguing that women had the power 
to choose a more civilly active life if they choose to remain unmarried, when socially that 
was not considered acceptable (Kanowitz, 1973).  
Considering the societal standards of the eighteenth century, and the needs of the 
colonies in that setting, author and historian Marylynn Salmon attempts to evaluate 
Blackstone’s theories in stating that: 
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The law of husband and wife thus bound the interests of spouses closely 
together. Ideally the system should have worked. If men always acted 
wisely and fairly, the common law rules might have served everyone well 
enough. To say that they did not is only to state the obvious. Unity of a 
Person was based on the perfect marriage, and therefore it inevitably 
created hardships in marriages that were less than ideal. (1986, p. 53) 
Though early America may have been an environment in which these concepts 
were not questioned, the laws constructed in the shadow of Blackstone’s writings on 
coverture in marriage solidified female inferiority for generations.  
The Constitution and Separate Spheres of Influence 
 
 As the new American system of government emerged, so did the opportunity to 
improve upon the status of women. Colonists began drafting the Declaration of 
Independence, and women’s role in society was further solidified as second to men. 
While the Founding Fathers were meeting to construct the Declaration, Abigail Adams 
wrote to her husband, John, with a plea to consider women when formalizing the 
document (Kuersten, 2003). She stated:  
I desire you would remember the ladies and be more generous and 
favorable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power 
into the hands of husbands. Men of sense in all ages abhor those customs 
which treat us only as the [servants] of your sex; regard us then as being 
placed by Providence under your protection, and in imitation of the 
Supreme Being make use of that power only for our happiness. (Kuersten, 
2003, p. 5) 
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Unfortunately, the founders did not take Abigail Adams’s request into consideration. 
Many of the most prominent figures in American history were in fact, vehemently against 
equality for women. Thomas Jefferson said “were our state a pure democracy…[women] 
would yet be excluded from deliberations… women, who, to prevent deprivation of 
morals and ambiguity of issues, should not mix promiscuously in the public meetings of 
men” (Kuersten, 2003, p. xv). This idea is echoed in the Constitution, which also fails to 
address the inequality of women in society (Kuersten, 2003).  
 Many women saw the potential for progress in the passage of the Bill of Rights. 
The Fourteenth Amendment held particular promise, and, as will be discussed later, was 
used in multiple cases to advocate for the equal rights of women. The amendment states:  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law, which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Though this amendment does seem to hold promise for women of this time, 
guaranteeing that their privileges as citizens must remain intact, this was not 
immediately the case. The courts failed to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as 
a means to grant women equality in nearly every case during the early 1800’s 
(Kanowitz, 1969).  
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During the middle of the nineteenth century, it was widely accepted that 
men and women each had their own distinct domain, one outside of the home, and 
one within the home. The first women’s movement attempted to challenge this 
concept of “separate spheres of influences” for men and women (Kuersten, 2003, 
p. xvi). This idea continued to perpetuate inequality between the sexes, making it 
increasingly difficult for women to gain a presence outside of their own home 
(Kuersten, 2003). A small victory for women was achieved during this time in the 
success of Married Women’s Property Acts, which were passed in 28 states 
between 1839 and 1865 (Kuersten, 2003, p. 11). These acts, which varied 
somewhat by state, allowed some rights to married women over their own 
property. They also made divorce slightly less devastating for women, as 
previously it would often leave them without anything to their names (Kuersten, 
2003). These Acts only allowed so much control to wives, however, and men 
could still control much of their wives’ property without their consent (Kuersten, 
2003).  
Little was done during this phase of American history to advance the plight of 
women. Even small advancements could not be fully utilized to improve the social and 
political realities of this time. Law professor and scholar Leo Kanowitz describes the 
frustration and apparent hypocrisy of this time in saying: 
It had been held that a statute requiring a husband to consent to a wife’s 
will depriving him of more than two-thirds of her estate did not violate the 
equal protection guarantee though the husband could make such 
disposition without the wife’s consent…Even a state constitutional 
Women	  in	  Legislation	   15	  
provision guaranteeing to ‘both male and female citizens’ the equal 
enjoyment of ‘all civil, political, and religious rights and privileges’ [could 
not be utilized to change that] sex based classification had ‘always been 
made, and…is a natural and proper one to make. (1969, p. 151)  
Though it may seem that these foundations were insignificant, these steps were vital to 
initiating what became the first organized movement for the equality of women. 
The Early Push for Women’s Rights 
Many women saw the passage of the first Women’s Property Acts as an 
opportunity to challenge other foundational elements of coverture (Kuersten, 2003). The 
Women’s Property Acts, in addition to the antislavery movement inspired the origins of 
the early women’s movement. Women including Lucretia Mott, Angelina and Sarah 
Grimke, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton started their work for equality in the abolition 
movement. In doing so, they learned the necessary political savvy to encourage male 
politicians advocate for change (Kuersten, 2003). Mott and Stanton used their experience 
in the antislavery movement to also begin promoting women’s rights. Their first step was 
to formalize a meeting in an effort to garner support.  
The Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 was the culmination of “a collective effort 
in an attempt to equalize women’s rights” (Kuersten, 2003, p. xvi). This meeting is often 
regarded as the origin of the women’s right movement. The convention, and the 
“Declaration of Sentiments” that followed, called for more than just suffrage, but the 
overall need for gender equality (Kuersten, 2003). The “Declaration of Sentiments” was 
modeled after the Declaration of Independence and “presented demands for equal rights 
of women in marriage, education, religion, employment, and politics” (Kuersten, 2003, p. 
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5). Despite this mobilization of women, the movement experienced a number of setbacks, 
many of which reflected the influence of common law and coverture. 
In 1872, Susan B. Anthony, one of the major figures of the women’s movement 
for suffrage and equality, was arrested and convicted of voting (Kuersten, 2003). 
Anthony and her sisters entered a registration center and demanded to be added to the 
voter registry. Election officers at the site refused, but the Anthony sisters were adamant, 
quoting the Fourteenth Amendment and threatening to take legal action against the men. 
After discussing the legitimacy of that threat with their superiors, the election officers 
allowed the women to cast their ballots, though Anthony was arrested a few days later 
(Linder, 2001).  
During her trial, Susan B. Anthony’s defense hinged on the assertion that her 
persecution was exclusively a result of her gender. The defense opened by stating that 
“the crime therefore consists not in the act done, but in the simple fact that the person 
doing it was a woman and not a man, I believe this is the first instance in which a woman 
has been arraigned in a criminal court, merely on account of her sex...” (Linder, 2001, p. 
4). Anthony’s attorney also insisted that her ability to vote was protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which prevented the creation or use of any law “which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” (Linder, 2001, p. 4).  
Unfortunately, the presiding judge, Judge Hunt, did not rule in Anthony’s favor. The 
judge held that, “the Fourteenth Amendment gives no right to a woman to vote, and the 
voting by Miss Anthony was in violation of the law” (Linder, 2001, p. 4). This was the 
first of what would be many disappointing rulings that would inhibit the progression of 
the rights of women.  
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The decision in the 1873 case of Bradwell v. Illinois also reinforced many of 
Blackstone’s ideals. Myra Bradwell insisted that, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
constitution, she retained the right to practice law in the state of Illinois (Kanowitz, 
1969). Mrs. Bradwell stated that it was “neither a crime nor a disqualification to be a 
married woman,” though the legal realities of that time seemed to imply otherwise 
(Kuersten, 2003, p. xviii). The court denied her claim, concluding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment in no way allocated the ability to practice law to women. In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Bradley stated, “it was not with the slightest expectation that this 
privilege would be extended to women” (Kanowitz, 1969, p. 44). He went on to justify 
this statement using similar language to Blackstone’s writings, saying, “The paramount 
destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and 
mother. This is the Law of the Creator” (Kanowitz, 1969, p. 44). Further outlining the 
social standing of women, Bradley continued, “Man is, or should be, woman’s protector 
and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female 
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life” (Kanowitz, 1969, p. 87).   
There are a number of cases in which respected justices continued to defend the 
role of women as civilly inferior. Rosencrantz v. Territory of Washington discussed the 
issue of female participation in juries. Though the court ruled that women could serve as 
jurors, in his dissent, Justice Turner shows the continued prevalence of Blackstone’s 
ideals, stating that he did not believe “that females are competent under the law as grand 
or potit jurors” (Rosencrantz, 1885, p. 308). He goes on to explain his reasoning, citing 
women as “the weaker sex” and claiming that their “delicacy” requires protection 
(Rosencrantz, 1885, p. 309). Justice Turner stated, 
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I cannot say, however, that I wish to see them perform the duties of jurors. 
The liability to perform jury duty is an obligation, not a right. In the case 
of woman, it is not necessary that she should accept the obligation to 
secure or maintain her rights. If it were, I should stifle all expression of the 
repugnance that I feel at seeing her introduced into associations, and 
exposed to influences which… must, in my opinion, shock and blunt those 
fine sensibilities, the possession of which is her chiefest charm, and the 
protection of which, under the religion and laws of all countries…is her 
most sacred right. (Rosencrantz, 1885, p. 310) 
Granting women suffrage was also a major issue of the time. The courts, up to 
this point, had failed to grant women protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
making it very difficult to establish a precedent that would allow women the right to vote 
(Kuersten, 2003). The notion of separate spheres for the sexes was still widely accepted, 
and many feared that merging the two worlds would damage the social foundations of 
American life. Arguments against granting women the ability to vote included that doing 
so “would be a detriment to the American family” (Kuersten, 2003, p. xix). This concern 
did not exclusively come from men. Many women also believed that “societal interests 
were best served through a system of domestic and political subordination” (Kuersten, 
2003, p. xix). Women’s groups were further disjointed over the concept of universal 
suffrage for women. While some believed it was inherently necessary for all women to 
receive the right to vote, other groups insisted that voting be limited to the “highly 
literate” and those with “outstanding moral character” (Kuersten, 2003, p. xx). These 
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ideological divides ultimately interfered with the women’s movement’s ability to present 
a clear and cohesive message.  
Though the women’s movement struggled to gain national clout, they did have 
some success in appealing to state legislators to grant women suffrage. Because states 
were free to create their own qualifications for voters, the lack of national cohesion 
proved to be less of a barrier (Kuersten, 2003). In 1890, Wyoming granted women the 
right to vote, followed by Colorado, Idaho, and Utah (Kuersten, 2003). As women gained 
a foothold on individual states, critics of suffrage became more vocal. “Unable to choose 
between candidates or among issues, these critics said, women would vote according to 
their husbands’ preferences, so women’s suffrage was simply giving married men two 
votes…” (Kuersten, 2003, p. xx).  
The success of Prohibition renewed the sense of hope that women could 
conceivably pass a suffrage amendment as well (Kuersten, 2003). The First World War 
also played a role in advancing the women’s right movement. “In the immediate 
aftermath of the first World War, a combination of powerful rhetoric invoking modernity, 
democracy, and national superiority tipped the scales in favor of woman suffrage” 
(Thomas, 2011, p. 6). A radical women’s group called the National Woman’s Party, led a 
series of protests in front of the White House, which led to a number of their leaders’ 
incarcerations. After an incredibly successful public sympathy campaign on behalf of the 
women who were jailed, Woodrow Wilson publically supported the proposed suffrage 
amendment in 1918 (Kuersten, 2003). 
 The amendment plainly stated that the right to vote “shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States nor any State on account of sex” (Kuersten, 2003, p. xxi). 
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Congress approved the Nineteenth Amendment by the summer of 1920, and it was 
ratified by the states that August. Professor of gender and women’s studies, Ashlyn 
Kuersten, discussed the impact of this landmark in saying:  
Not only did the amendment void state laws that limited women’s 
suffrage, but it was the first constitutional protection specific to women. It 
had been over a hundred years since the colonists had demanded popular 
sovereignty from their British king; finally, women were included in the 
privileges granted by national citizenship. (2003, p. xxi)  
This marked a major victory in the woman’s movement that proved to be a significant 
milestone in the struggle for gender equality.  
World War II 
 
The onset of World War II proved to be the catalyst for change in terms of 
women’s role in American society. The nature of war in and of itself is a contributing 
factor to the general shift in societal mores regarding women. “The dislocations of a 
nation at war have always created important challenges to traditional assumptions and 
practices” (Anderson, 1981, p. 1). Though there was potential for the immediate demands 
of war to lead to long-term change in cultural values, many of the advancements that 
occurred during the war did not continue in the decade after (Kuersten, 2003, p. xxii).  
As men were deployed to fight overseas in the early 1940s, the workforce needed 
to be sustained by the women at home. In order to provide both the materials needed to 
successfully engage in war while still meeting civilian needs, “women…assumed 
economic roles traditionally ascribed to men” (Anderson, 1981, p. 1). A number of 
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organizations including the American government joined in a campaign imploring 
women to answer the call of their country.  
Women responded in staggering numbers. “At the wartime peak in July of 1944, 
19 million women were employed, an increase of 47 percent over the March 1940 level” 
(Anderson, 1981, p. 2). There is more to be discovered in this shift than just numbers; a 
closer look at the composition of the women’s labor force reveals that, due to the level of 
need, the number of working women did not only include single women. “For the first 
time in U.S. history, married women outnumbered single women in the female work 
force” (Anderson, 1981, p. 2). Between 1940 and 1944 the number of married women 
who were also employed “increased by 2 million, 72.2 percent of the total increase” 
(Anderson, 1981, p. 2). The contributions of women during World War Two were 
remarkable, but the changes of wartime subsided upon the conclusion of the War. “Rosie 
[the Riveter] could have been in the vanguard of social change for women,” but, for 
many reasons, the momentum gained during the Second World War was short lived 
(Anderson, 1981, p. 1).  
When the men returned from the service, many women were encouraged to return 
to their homes (Kuersten, 2003). This exodus was further encouraged by the dramatic 
increase in birth rates of the baby boom. Women left their jobs to care for their rapidly 
expanding families (Kuersten, 2003). Women who chose to remain in the workforce were 
met with “seniority rankings, and preferential hiring of veterans” (Anderson, 1981, p. 7). 
If they were able to get or maintain employment, they did so for considerably lower 
wages, in positions that required significantly less skills than during the war. The “sex-
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segregated labor market was successfully re-established during the reconversion period” 
(Anderson, 1981, p. 7).  
Much of the propaganda used to mobilize the female work force during the war 
“stressed ideological continuity. The appeals used…emphasized the temporary and 
aberrant nature of the situation” (Anderson, 1981, p. 10). Ultimately, this allowed the 
general public to accept the change in female employment without it fundamentally 
challenging what people believed of women’s roles. Any reformation on an ideological 
level was met with fierce opposition:  
The changes in women’s roles caused by the war created considerable 
anxiety about the stability and durability of the family, as working mothers 
were blamed by many for a rising divorce rate, child neglect… and a host 
of other ills supposedly exacerbated by women’s newly acquired 
independence. (Anderson, 1981, p. 10)  
The resistance to allow too much female progression is reflected in a number of 
court decisions in the early 1950s. In the case of Bonanno v. Bonanno (1950), the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey almost directly affirms Blackstone’s early writings in 
establishing the husband as his wife’s keeper (Kanowitz, 1973). The separated, but still 
married, couple was disputing the amount of alimony that should be considered 
acceptable given the husband’s income and employment status.  
Justice Ackerson delivered the opinion of the court stating, “The fundamental 
duty imposed by the common law upon a husband has long been recognized and enforced 
in this state. The duty to support and maintain his wife is the husband’s primary 
obligation…” (Kanowitz, 1973, p. 64). Not only does the justice directly affirm the 
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common law tradition, he also addresses and discredits the progress made in this area. He 
continues to say, “The Married Women’s Act, giving a wife rights which she did not 
formerly enjoy at common law, has not changed the common law duty of her husband to 
provide her with adequate support… such duty still devolves upon the husband” 
(Kanowitz, 1973, p. 65).  
While it may seem that requiring a husband to pay alimony is a victory for 
women, the implications of this ruling actually do more to inhibit women from advancing 
in terms of equality. In her article, “Women as Property”, feminist activist Verna 
Tomasson addressed the connotations of alimony directly, saying:  
The concept of alimony is an insult to women. It does not represent 
payment for household labor done. It represents a concession to the fact 
that men and women do not have equal opportunities for employment…. 
Alimony says ‘here, you poor, helpless, unqualified, and useless person, 
take this. (1970, p. 1) 
 The courts again impeded the progression of women beyond their conventional 
gender roles in 1956. The case of State v. Hunter involved a woman who competed in a 
wrestling competition. The district attorney accused Ms. Hunter of knowingly violating 
the “peace and dignity of the State of Oregon” by participating in the wrestling match 
even though she was not a man (Kanowitz, 1973, p. 49). In delivering the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Oregon, Justice Tooze revealed a staggering level of contempt towards 
the progress of females beyond traditional gender roles. He defended the conviction of 
Ms. Hunter by the lower courts in his decision:  
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Obviously it intended that there should be at least one island on the sea of 
life reserved for man that would be impregnable to the assault of woman. 
It had watched her emerge from long tresses and demure ways to bobbed 
hair and almost complete sophistication; from a creature needing and 
depending upon the protection and chivalry of man to one asserting 
complete independence. She had already invaded practically every activity 
formerly considered suitable and appropriate for men only… in the field 
of sports… in the business and industrial fields…in politics, as well as in 
almost every other human endeavor, she had matched her wits and 
prowess with those of man, and, we are frank to concede, in many 
instances outdone him. In these circumstances, is it any wonder that the 
legislative assembly took advantage of the police power of the state in its 
decision to halt this ever increasing feminine encroachment…was the act 
unjust… have her civil or political rights been unconstitutionally denied? 
Under the current circumstances, we think not. (Kanowitz, 1973, p. 50-51)  
This period in American history showed significant promise as an opportunity for 
women to advance in a wide range of areas from education to employment. 
Unfortunately, the progress of women was continually met with resistance and a 
commitment to those foundational values that kept women inferior socially, legally, 
economically, and politically.  
Second Wave Feminism 
 
 In the final years of the 1950s, the Civil Rights Movement was just beginning in 
America. This movement helped inspire the re-emergence of an organized women’s 
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movement. Many proponents for women’s rights were inspired by the strategy used in the 
Civil Rights Movement to elicit dramatic changes in legislation (Kuersten, 2003). The 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) “embarked on 
an expansive judicial interpretation of existing constitutional rights” as opposed to 
financially funding lobbying efforts (Kuersten, 2003, p. xxii). This gave women a method 
to emulate in the 1960s as the voice of the women’s movement finally began to unify 
(Kuersten, 2003, p. xxii).  
 The 1960s began with significant changes for women. Major advancements in 
contraceptives took place in 1960 with the creation of the world’s first birth control pill 
(Kuersten, 2003). The following year, President Kennedy held a Commission on the 
Status of Women. The Commission primarily conducted national research on the status 
of women, and gave many women the opportunity to be heard on a national scale 
(Kuersten, 2003).  
 In 1963, Betty Friedan wrote The Feminine Mystique, thrusting her into the 
spotlight of the women’s movement. This book proved to be a crucial element in 
reorganizing the women’s movement in this decade. In an unconventional approach, 
Friedan did not challenge specific legislation, but rather the overall social reality of the 
lives of women, much of which reflected the ideals expressed in those early writings by 
Blackstone. She wrote, “over and over women heard in voices of tradition… that they 
could desire no greater destiny than to glory in their own femininity” (Friedan, 1963, p. 
1).  
Though Friedan only focused on the plight of middle class women, this book 
struck a chord across the country, “and largely ushered in the second ‘wave’ of the 
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women’s movement” (Kuersten, 2003, p. xxiii). Friedan opened the book by attempting 
to define what she called “the problem with no name,” saying:  
The problem lay buried, unspoken, for many years in the minds of 
American women. It was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a 
yearning that women suffered in the middle of the twentieth century in the 
United States. Each suburban wife struggled with it alone. As she made 
the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate peanut 
butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and 
Brownies, lay beside her husband at night – she was afraid to ask even of 
herself the silent question – is this all? (1963, p. 1) 
 The articulation of the separate spheres by Friedan and the mobilization that 
followed ushered in a number of important changes for women. In 1963 Friedan and a 
number of others organized the National Organization for women (NOW) “to lobby for 
the inclusion of women in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 
repeal of criminal abortion laws, and passage of the Equal Rights Amendment” 
(Kuersten, 2003, p. xxiii). In this new wave, women focused on gender equality more so 
than women’s rights. The legislation supported by the women’s movement, especially the 
Equal Pay Act and the Equal Rights Amendment, sought to eliminate the prevalence of 
the protective legislation of the past. They instead demanded, that equality would be 
enforced for both genders on a federal level (Kuersten, 2003).  
 The 1960s also brought a number of judicial decisions that both advanced and 
hindered the progression of women. In 1965, the Supreme Court overturned the 
Comstock Act of 1873, which stated that the U.S. Mail could not be used to obtain 
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information on contraceptives. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the court instead decided that 
the expectation of privacy should be expanded to include whatever form of family 
planning people choose. In his majority opinion, Justice William Douglas rhetorically 
asked, “Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for 
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of 
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship” (Kuersten, 2003, p. xxx). This case served 
as a victory for women, who now had some legal protection in their use of contraception. 
This ruling is far from perfect however, as the Justice touched on the privacy between 
married couples only.   
 The following year, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to discuss some of 
the foundational elements of a woman’s role in American. The case, U.S. v. Yazell, forced 
the Justices into a conversation about coverture, and though the ruling did not favor 
women, this case was an excellent opportunity to discuss the legal legitimacy of 
Blackstone’s writings as they applied to the modern world. 
 The Yazell’s received a disaster loan from the SBA after a flood damaged their 
shop. When they defaulted on that loan, Mrs. Yazell argued that, under the Texas law of 
coverture, she could not be bound to the obligations of the loan because she could not 
execute a valid contract. The court held that the Texas law should stand in this case on 
the grounds that there was not a more prominent federal interest.  In other words, the 
court affirmed that coverture should stand. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black wrote 
that the doctrine rests “on the old common-law fiction that the husband and wife are 
one… [which] has worked out in reality to mean… the one is the husband” (Kanowitz, 
1973, p. 63). To a large extent, he argued, “those changed [upon marriage] reflected the 
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feudal theory of ‘natural male dominance’ – a theory that is far from dead in modern 
times” (Kanowitz, 1973, p. 63).  
 Though the courts did show some level of progress in the recognition of women 
as civic equals, there were several cases in which women were still regarded as inferior in 
terms of their responsibilities in citizenship. In U.S. v. St. Clair a man argued that the 
draft was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it discriminates on the basis of sex (Kanowitz, 1973, p. 69). The 
defendant claimed that because “Congress has established women’s corps in the various 
branches of the Armed Forces… Congress had treated the sexes equally with respect to 
their ability to serve in the Armed Forces” (Kanowitz, 1973, p. 71). The defendant argued 
that the recognition of women’s ability to contribute to the Armed Forces established in 
the creation of their own corps meant that they should be equally eligible for the draft. 
Though the role of women in the Armed Service had expanded greatly, the Court did not 
feel that women should be equally eligible for the draft.  
The Supreme Court ruled that women were “still regarded as the center of home 
and family life” and that they should “be afforded special recognition” (Kanowitz, 1973, 
p. 71). In establishing service rules for the Armed forces, the justices believed that 
“Congress followed the teachings of history that if a nation is to survive, men must 
provide the first line of defense while women keep the home fires burning” (Kanowitz, 
1973, p. 71). This reflected a similar logic to the “protective” legislation ushered in 
during the 1950s, ultimately solidifying substantial legal differences between men and 
women.  
A New Standard Of Review 
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 The 1970s proved to be a crucial decade in the fight for gender equality. The 
progress made in the previous decade, coupled with the revitalization of a passionate 
women’s movement led to a number of significant decisions in favor of women 
becoming equal citizens (Kuersten, 2003).  
 In 1971, the Supreme Court decided on Reed v. Reed, a case that would become 
the judicial precedent for a number of cases regarding the equal protection of women. 
The case involved two parents petitioning for the ability to administer their deceased 
son’s estate. The Idaho courts originally relied on a state code that labeled the boy’s 
father, Cecil Reed, as administrator over his mother on the sole basis that he was male 
(Kanowitz, 1973). The Idaho statute highlighted that the mother or father be granted the 
ability, but provided that “of several persons claiming and equally entitled [under § 15-
312] to administer, males must be preferred to females…” (Kanowitz, 1973, p. 514). His 
mother, Sally Reed, appealed this decision on the grounds that the state code violated her 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, a legal argument that many women 
had used before her (Kanowitz, 1973).  
 When the case reached the Supreme Court the Justices decided, for the first time 
in American history, that discrimination based on gender did in fact violate a woman’s 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the court, 
stating that “the arbitrary preference established in favor of males by § 15-314 of the 
Idaho Code cannot stand in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no 
State deny the equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction” 
(Kanowitz, 1973, p. 515). The Justices based this decision on the logic that differential 
treatment can only be upheld if it rests “upon some ground of difference having a fair and 
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substantial relation to the object of the legislation” (Kanowitz, 1973, p. 516). In 
considering whether sex served as a reason with relation to the goal of the code, the court 
decided that it was, in fact “arbitrary.” Justice Burger summarized the opinion of the 
court in saying, “by providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus 
similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause” 
(Kanowitz, 1973, p. 516).  
 Reed v. Reed set an important precedent and served as an opportunity for women 
to demand equality in a number of other realms. One of the major figures of the women’s 
movement during the 1970s was Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Ginsburg was teaching at 
Columbia Law, while also directing the Women’s Rights Project at the American Civil 
Liberties Union (Thomas, 2011). Before becoming the second female Supreme Court 
Justice, she played an instrumental role in devising the strategy that was used to develop 
sex discrimination law.  
Ginsburg explained this strategy through saying that the objective of the 
Women’s Rights Project “was to obtain thoughtful consideration of the assumptions 
underlying, and the purposes served by, sex-based classifications” (Thomas, 2011, p. 11). 
Ginsburg led a charge to challenge the differential treatment of the sexes, which had been 
rationalized as having been “reflective of natural differences” to that point (Thomas, 
2011, p. 12). The Women’s Rights project openly attacked the protective legislation of 
the previous decade including provisions such as alimony, employment restrictions, and 
limited jury service. After the Reed v. Reed decision, “Ginsburg then encouraged the 
Court to adopt a heightened level of scrutiny for reviewing distinctions on the basis of 
sex” (Thomas, 2011, p. 12).   
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This reformed standard of review was established in the 1976 case of Craig v. 
Boren. This case reviewed the legitimacy of Oklahoma’s drinking age, which at the time 
was 18 for females and 21 for males (Kuersten, 2011, p. xxv). Oklahoma argued that the 
differential treatment was based on the higher tendency for males to get into alcohol-
related accidents. Despite this claim, the Court decided that the law denied equal 
protection to men, and declared it unconstitutional (Kuersten, 2011, p. xxvi).  
This case built on the standard in Reed v. Reed to create a new “intermediate” 
level of scrutiny for gender discrimination claims. This intermediate scrutiny suggested 
that, “in order for a law that differentiated between men and women to prevail, the state 
had to prove that the use of sex as a classifying tool was substantially related to the 
advancement of an important government objective” (Kuersten, 2011, p. xxvi). Women 
used this new standard to make a number of other changes including the reformation of 
alimony laws and ensuring that public schools be available to both sexes (Kuersten, 
2011). 
Though this new level of scrutiny did serve to advance women closer to equality, 
there were still some examples in which, even given this intermediate level, statutes 
seemed to regard men and women as unequal. For example, around this time, 39 states 
had differing ages at which a boy or a girl could be married (Kanowitz, 1969, p. 10). In 
every state that enforced a different age for young men than women, with women 
permitted to marry at a younger age. While these states argued physical, mental, and 
emotional maturity to be the foundations for this difference, that, for many, is not a 
satisfactory explanation. Many feared that these ages were reflective of the idea that “the 
married state [was] the only proper goal of womanhood,” whereas “the male…while not 
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to be denied the benefits of marriage, should also be encouraged to engage in bigger, 
better, and more useful pursuits” (Kanowitz, 1969, p. 10).  
The intermediate level of scrutiny applied as a result of this time period 
successfully diminished the influence of the separate spheres doctrine that had been so 
pervasive in American culture (Kuersten, 2011). The Court successfully recognized the 
discriminatory nature of the protective legislation of the 1950s and 1960s, and, as a 
result, women began gaining ground in a number of important areas.  
The 70’s also included a number of advancements for women in both 
reproductive rights and education. In 1973, the Court decided Roe v. Wade, ruling that,  
“abortion was a fundamental right based on the right to privacy established in Griswold v. 
Connecticut” (Kuersten, 2011, p. xxx). In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that Texas’s 
state law banning abortions was unconstitutional on the grounds that the right to privacy 
was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy” (Kuersten, 2011, p. xxx).   
Many feminist movements targeted the education system as a source of the 
perpetuation of the now dated convention of separate spheres. “By 1973 over 500 
colleges and universities offered over 2,000 courses in women’s studies”, and 78 
institutions included women’s studies as an independent program (Berkley, 1999, p. 75). 
In a survey conducted on women’s educational goals in 1971, 18% of women still 
believed that “preparation for marriage and family was the most important reason for 
attending college” (Berkley, 1999, p. 75). By the conclusion of the 1970s, that figure 
plummeted to less than 1% (Berkley, 1999, p. 75).  
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This period in American history was unique in terms of the advancement of 
women. Progress was made not only in terms of judicial rulings, but also in the societal 
reality and expectations of women.  
 
Gender Equality in the 1980s and 1990s 
The 1980s and 1990s continued on the surge of progress enjoyed in the 1970s for 
women’s equality. In 1981, Ronald Reagan delivered on his promise to diversify the 
Supreme Court by nominating the first female Justice, Sandra Day O’Connor. In her first 
case, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, she voiced her opinion on gender 
discrimination, stating, “when the purpose of a law is to exclude members of one gender 
because they are presumed to… be innately inferior, the objective [of the law] is 
illegitimate (Kuersten, 2011, p. xxvi). During her time on the Court, O’Connor, along 
with four other justices, continued to support the “heightened standard of review for 
gender discrimination cases” established in the 1970s (Kuersten, 2011, p. xxvii).  
Despite promising positioning in the Court, the 1980s experienced a number of 
setbacks regarding reproductive rights. In 1981, a legislative program called the Family 
Protection Act was designed by the New Right in an effort to “strengthen” the American 
family (Berkley, 1999, p. 91). This movement called for “public policies favoring 
marriage, childbirth, heterosexuality, and the role of the husband as the head of the 
household” (Berkley, 1999, p. 91). Feminists spent much of the 1980s combatting 
reforms and restrictions made to abortion laws as the more conservative government 
pushed to limit access (Berkley, 1999).  
As a result of the prominence of women’s reproductive rights as a “wedge issue” 
in the 1980s, the 1990s featured an increase in female political engagement (Berkley, 
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1999). This increase was also spurred by the 1991 nomination of Clarence Thomas to the 
Supreme Court. Though Thomas was initially seen as an accomplished choice for a 
conservative seat, his Senate confirmation hearings brought accusations of sexual 
harassment from a former employee, Anita Hill (Kuersten, 2011). Hill never reported 
these allegations to her superiors, but many women had similar experiences of sexual 
harassment in the workplace, and were even more enraged when they saw Hill being 
questioned by the “all-male, all-white Senate” (Kuersten, 2011, p. xxxi). Following 
Thomas’s confirmation, the topic of sexual harassment in the workplace led to political 
activism, and in 1992 women took to the polls. Women were more represented in 
Congress, Governor’s seats, and judicial benches than at any other time in American 
history (Kuersten, 2011). Many called 1992 “the Year of the Woman” as a result 
(Kuersten, 2011, p. xxxii).  
This activism was short lived, however. As was evident in previous women’s 
rights victories, many groups lost visibility after 1992, and election rates for women 
dropped back to normal (Kuersten, 2011). The tensions that developed over this time 
period are representative of a significant shift in the influential capacity of women. These 
decades showcased women actively engaging in the national dialogue on gender equality 
issues, ultimately leading to a dramatic increase in civil rights and responsibilities from 
which they had once been completely excluded (Kuersten, 2011). Though many issues do 
not seem indicative of advancing the cause for equality, the overall engagement of 
women during this time was a notable achievement.  
Prevalence of Foundational Beliefs in Legislation Today 
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Upon examining the history of women’s fight for equality, it is clear that a 
number of incremental victories led, over time, to widespread change. “While law has 
and continues to operate as a restraint upon women’s full participation in society, law has 
also worked as a facilitating structure” (Thomas, 2011, p.1). It is vital to reexamine the 
gradual progression of women for a number of reasons, both to understand the restraints 
and facilitating nature of the law, and because “such reexaminations of American legal 
history contribute to discussions of the law and policy decisions of today in ways that 
promote women’s rights, women’s interests, and women’s empowerments” (Thomas, 
2011, p. 1). It is especially vital because, despite the progress that has been made, laws 
regarding sexual violence against women have evolved at a dramatically slower rate and 
are, even now, directly related to those legal precedents established upon the founding of 
our nation.  
Though there are a number of laws that could be examined as having progressed 
slower, and being connected to common law and coverture, this analysis will focus 
primarily on the evolution of marital rape laws in America. Throughout history it has 
been the case that, despite the advancement of women in a number of other areas, laws 
regarding sexual morality have undergone less reform than laws in other categories 
(Kanowitz, 1973, p. 104).  
In his writings, Blackstone claimed that a woman consented to a change in status 
by agreeing to marry. This consent, according to Blackstone, however, “ended abruptly at 
the church door” (Stretton, 2009, p. 123). This concept of a kind of eternal consent was 
one of the foundational elements in constructing early rape legislation. Under this 
assumption, clarified by Sir Matthew Hale, “a husband could not be found guilty of rape 
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within marriage for their mutual matrimonial consent” (Stretton, 2009, p. 123). This was 
further enforced by Blackstone’s concept of unity of a person. The understanding that a 
woman shared an identity with and became the property of her husband translated to 
mean that a husband was always entitled to his wife’s body. The contract of marriage 
insisted, according to Hale, “the wife hath given herself in this kind unto her husband, 
which she cannot retract” (Stretton, 2009, p. 123).  
These ideas were supported by societal expectations of the time as well. It was 
believed that, “the purpose of marriage was procreation and the wife’s promise to obey 
meant that the husband had a right to sexual intercourse with the wife upon all occasions. 
Her personal consent was irrelevant; the women’s subjective feelings on a particular 
occasion were not important” (Bourque, 1989, p. 115). These beliefs permeated in the 
American legal system with respect to marital rape. 
This resulted in dim legal realities for wives in America. Spousal exemption was 
the norm in all states for over nearly 200 years. It was not until the 1970s that efforts to 
reform rape statutes called attention to the need to reconsider spousal exemption 
(Bourque, 1989). In the Oregon v. Rideout case (1978), Greta Rideout accused her 
husband of rape. The trial took only six days. The jury did not feel that the prosecution 
had met the reasonable doubt standard, but the case did bring the issue onto a national 
stage (Bary, 1980). 
 The case was mentioned in the New York Times and The CBS Evening News. 
Many people discussed the defense’s claim that John Rideout felt he had a common law 
right to his wife (Bary, 1980). Greta Rideout’s sexual history also became a topic of 
conversation in national media coverage in an effort to rationalize what she did to cause 
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sexual aggression from her husband (Bary, 1980). This case, and the brutal media 
coverage that followed, forced many states to address the issue of spousal rape.   
Some states responded to the national debate brought on by the Oregon v. Rideout 
ruling by amending their statutes. Many limited these changes to only stipulate that the 
spousal exemption did not apply if the woman had legally withdrawn consent through 
separation, but some states amended statutes to explicitly say that a husband could be a 
charged for raping his wife (Bary, 1980).  
As more states began reforming their rape statutes, the issue became increasingly 
controversial. Some states completely repealed their spousal exemption legislation, while 
states such as Iowa and California followed with individual reforms. The president of the 
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association and head of the Oregon State Bar, Charles Burt, 
openly commented on “the absurdity of bringing the crime of rape as a law into 
marriage,” saying, “a woman who’s still in a marriage is presumably consenting to 
sex…Maybe this is the risk of being married” (Bary, 1980, p.1089). Other opponents of 
the reforms were concerned that eliminating spousal privilege gave “bitter women” too 
much accusatory power (Bary, 1980, p. 1090).  
It took until 1993 for every state to outlaw marital rape by removing spousal 
exemption entirely, eliminating marriage as a defense, or specifying marital rape as a new 
offense (RAINN, 2009). However, even now, each state has unique limitations for what 
acts can be considered marital rape. For example, eleven states require that there must 
have been the threat of force or actual force used in order for a husband to be convicted 
of rape (How, 2003, p 1-5).  South Carolina and Illinois both specify that the complaint 
must be filed within 30 days of the attack, and California requires that it must be filed 
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within a year (How, 2003, p. 1-5). Six states require that the couple have separate living 
situations, be in the process of getting divorced, or have a court ordered separation in 
order for the husband to be convicted of marital rape (How, 2003, p. 1-5).  
The ongoing struggle for gender equality has been marked with legal victories and 
disappointments. Women have advanced beyond the restricted sphere of influence to 
which they were once bound, overcoming societal conventions, educational and 
employment limitations, and centuries of legal precedent. Despite the immense changes 
in women’s rights in American history, there are clearly some remnants of coverture in 
society today. Ideally, this examination of the overall progression of women will call 
attention to the areas in which we can still hope to improve.   
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